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I present a model that explains two common features of regulatory enforcement: selective
forgiveness of noncompliance, and the collection of information on a ﬁrm’s compliance
activities and not just its compliance status. I show that forgiving noncompliance is
o p t i m a li ft h ei n f o r m a t i o no naﬁrm’s compliance activities constitutes suﬃciently strong
evidence of the ﬁrm having exerted a high level of compliance eﬀort. The key beneﬁt
of forgiving noncompliance is a reduction in the probability with which the ﬁrm needs
to be monitored. If ﬁnes are costly, a further beneﬁt is a reduction in ﬁne costs.
Keywords: enforcement of regulation, selective enforcement, forgiving noncompliance
JEL Classiﬁcation: L51, K42, K32, D86
*I thank Roberto Samaniego and Jorge Soares for helpful comments and suggestions on an
earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to participants of the 2006 South Asia Meetings of
the Econometric Society for their comments. Any remaining errors are my own.1. Introduction
Economic models of regulatory enforcement typically assume that penalties for detected noncom-
pliance are certain and swift. Regulations are rigidly enforced and noncompliance when detected
is never forgiven. In the language of the policy literature on regulation, economic models typically
embody the “deterrent approach” to enforcement, ﬁrst formalized by Becker (1968) and Stigler
(1970). Regulatory scholars have argued that this approach has proven ineﬀective at securing com-
pliance, and needlessly fosters an adversarial relationship between regulators and the regulated
(Bardach and Kagan 1982). The approach advocated by a number of scholars is the “cooperative
approach.” This approach favors selective enforcement that takes into account the circumstances
of observed violations (Scholz 1984) 1 In particular, under the cooperative approach, “regulators
are more inclined to interpret rules ﬂexibly, particularly when they believe ﬁrms are making good
faith eﬀorts to comply” (Harrison 1995). The cooperative approach, it is argued, is more likely to
result in cost-eﬀective enforcement and desirable regulatory outcomes (Bardach and Kagan 1982).
Cross-country comparisons of "regulatory styles" in the enforcement of health, safety, and envi-
ronmental regulations indicate that the cooperative approach is common in Western Europe, Japan
and Canada, whereas the deterrent approach is common in the U.S. (Harrison 1995, Kitamura 2000,
Hawkins 1984). Even in the U.S., studies of enforcement ﬁnd evidence of selective enforcement in a
range of regulatory settings. For example, guidelines for enforcement of water pollution regulations,
explicitly recommend that agencies be willing to forgive short-term violations, and that criminal
ﬁnes be reserved for willful or negligent violations (Russell et al. 1986, Chapter 3, and Code of
1As Scholz and others have observed, the diﬀerences between the two approaches are not always clear
cut. There is also considerable variation in terminology: the cooperative approach is also referred to as the
“compliance” or “bargaining” approach, and the deterrent approach as the “sanctioning” or “rule-oriented”
approach, among other possibilities. A third approach that has gained favor in recent years is “responsive
regulation” (Scholz, Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Nielsen 2006). This approach is, roughly speaking, an
amalgam of the ﬁrst two: the regulator ﬁrst adopts a cooperative posture, but resorts to deterrence if the
ﬁrm proves recalcitrant.
1Federal Regulations 2004).2
In this paper, I show that a simple deterrence-based model of regulatory enforcement can be
extended to allow for selective enforcement that takes into account a ﬁrm’s eﬀorts to comply. In
the model, the regulator forgives noncompliance if it is able to obtain suﬃciently strong evidence
that the regulated ﬁrm had exerted a high level of compliance eﬀort. This evidence takes the form
of an additional signal of the ﬁrm’s eﬀort acquired by the regulator at some cost. This, possibly
multi-dimensional, signal represents the results of inspections of a ﬁrm’s records, interviews with
its employees, or evaluations of its processes and procedures for achieving compliance. Collection
of such information is a common element of enforcement practices.
The key beneﬁt of forgiving noncompliance is, rather surprisingly, a reduction in the probability
with which the ﬁrm needs to be monitored. The additional signal of the ﬁrm’s compliance eﬀort,
coupled with selective forgiveness, allows for an increase in the power of the regulator’s penalty
scheme. Thus, the model provides a simple eﬃciency-based justiﬁcation for selective enforcement
based on an assessment of a violator’s eﬀorts to comply. This is accomplished in the context of a
(noncooperative) principal-agent model with moral hazard.
The paper is related to several diﬀerent strands in the existing literature on regulatory enforce-
ment. To the extent that it provides a justiﬁcation for selective enforcement, it is related to work
by Garvie and Keeler explaining the variation in enforcement styles in the United States. They
analyze a model in which ﬁnes for noncompliance depend on the budget-constrained regulator’s
enforcement eﬀort and on the characteristics of the judicial process. They show that the regula-
tor’s optimal enforcement style depends on the cost of monitoring and on the responsiveness of
judicially-determined ﬁnes to the regulator’s enforcement eﬀort. The optimal enforcement style
2Further evidence of selective enforcement in the U.S. can be found in Harrington (1988), who describes
studies of U.S. environmental enforcement that reveal penalties are rarely imposed when violations are
discovered. This is not simply a manifestation of lax enforcement, since compliance rates appear to be
high. Hunter and Wasserman (1996) present similar results, and report that for 30 percent of the pollution
violations examined, no action was taken by regulators beyond telephone calls and meetings with ﬁrms.
Lofgren (1989) in a study of OSHA enforcement of safety and health regulations, reports that violations
routinely go unpunished, yet OSHA enforcement has been deemed quite eﬀective (Weil 1996). For evidence
of selective enforcement in Europe, see, for example, the fascinating account by Hawkins (1984) of ﬁeld-level
environmental enforcement in Britain.
2resembles the cooperative approach when monitoring is inexpensive and the responsiveness of ﬁnes
is limited (rendering ﬁnes more costly for the regulator); and resembles the deterrent approach
when monitoring is expensive and the responsiveness of ﬁn e si sh i g h .
The paper is also related to work by Jost (1997) on optimal enforcement when penalties are
subject to judicial appeal. He considers a model with deterministic compliance in which a regulator
must allocate its limited budget between two activities: monitoring, which yields an imperfect
signal of a ﬁrm’s compliance status, and investigations, which reveal compliance status perfectly.
Investigations are conducted only when a ﬁrm appeals penalties for noncompliance in court. The
appeal can result in penalties being waived.
The paper is also related, in spirit, to work by Nyborg and Telle (2004) that oﬀers an explanation
for the warnings frequently issued by regulators upon detecting noncompliance. In their model, a
budget-constrained regulator attempts to control the behavior of ﬁrms that may be noncompliant
by mistake. Firms detected in noncompliance are issued warnings and can come into compliance
by incurring a “veriﬁcation cost” in addition to the cost of compliance they would have incurred
had they been compliant from the outset. In this setting, warnings can reduce the probability of
accidentally switching from a full-compliance equilibrium to a no-compliance equilibrium.
The paper is arguably most closely related to a body of literature that attempts to explain the
paradox of widespread compliance with environmental regulations despite infrequent punishment of
noncompliance. Harrington (1988) shows that this paradox may be explained by a state-dependent
enforcement strategy in which penalties depend not only on current noncompliance but also on
past noncompliance. Livernois and McKenna (1999) provide an alternative explanation based on
a model in which ﬁrms must self-report their compliance status. Heyes and Rickman (1999) argue
that the paradox may reﬂect “regulatory dealing,” with the regulator choosing to forgive a ﬁrm’s
noncompliance in one context (e.g., air pollution control), in exchange for compliance in another
(e.g., water pollution control). In all three of these papers, the optimal penalty for some types of
noncompliance may be zero, in other words, some types of noncompliance may be forgiven.
The model presented here is similar to those in the literature just mentioned in that it yields
conditions under which setting the ﬁne for noncompliance equal to zero is optimal. But it diﬀers
3in a number of important respects. The model explicitly attempts to capture the key principle
underlying selective enforcement: that enforcement should take into account the circumstances of
a violation, in particular the extent of a violator’s eﬀorts to comply. This is not true of any of the
existing literature.
The model also diﬀers from those in the existing literature in that it incorporates, and justiﬁes,
the practice of collecting information not just on a ﬁrm’s compliance status, but also on a variety of
other measures.3 In the U.S., for example, “compliance monitoring” by environmental regulators
typically includes inspection of production and abatement equipment, review of a ﬁrm’s records,
and interviews with its employees (Hunter and Waterman 1996, 39-46). Hawkins, and Nyborg and
Telle report similar practices in Britain and Norway. This additional information makes selective
enforcement possible in the model.
Consistent with the notion that ﬁrms may be noncompliant despite good faith eﬀorts to comply,
compliance is modeled as being probabilistic. This reﬂects the fact that a ﬁrm’s compliance status
often depends on factors that are inherently diﬃcult for it to control. For example, equipment
malfunctions or input quality variations may result in output that does not meet product quality
or product safety standards. In the case of pollution control regulations, violations can also occur
because of treatment process upsets (Russell et al. 1986, Chapter 3). More generally, compliance
can be probabilistic in any setting in which ﬁrms can make mistakes. Nyborg and Telle point out
that mistakes could arise from agency problems within the ﬁrm–the level of compliance eﬀort
d e s i r e db yt h eﬁrm’s management may not be exerted by subordinates.
A ﬁnal feature of the model is that it allows for the possibility that the regulator may only
be able to observe the ﬁrm’s compliance status imperfectly.4 This is true, for example, when
compliance with product quality or product safety standards is determined by examining a sample
of a ﬁrm’s output. In the case of environmental regulations, limitations of pollution measurement
techniques can result in a ﬁrm’s compliance status being observed imperfectly (Russell et al., 1986,
3An exception is Malik (2006), who presents a model of environmental regulation that incorporates
information on ﬁrm behavior other than its observed emissions. The focus of his paper is the design of
optimal environmental regulation rather than selective enforcement of regulations.
4Harford (1991) and Jost (1997), among others, allow for imperfect observation of compliance.
4Chap. 3). More generally, if noncompliance is a fugitive event, establishing that it occurred at a
later date is likely to be subject to error. For example, a temporary violation of a workplace safety
regulation may be diﬃcult to detect after the fact. Similarly, an accidental discharge of pollution
into a water body may be diﬃcult to detect, or attribute, once the pollutant has dispersed.
The basic model of regulatory enforcement is presented in the next section. In Section 3, I then
characterize the optimal enforcement policy under the assumption that ﬁnes are costless transfers.
I show that forgiveness can reduce the probability with which the ﬁrm must be monitored, yielding
savings in expected inspection costs. I also identify a suﬃcient condition for forgiveness to be
socially desirable. The two subsequent sections consider extensions of the basic model. Section
4 introduces ﬁne costs and shows that these costs render the regulator more inclined to forgive
noncompliance. Self-reporting by the ﬁrm of its compliance status is introduced in Section 5. I
show that forgiveness may be even more likely in the presence of self-reporting. The ﬁnal section
contains some concluding remarks.
2. Model
Compliance with a regulation is modeled as a binary event. The probability the ﬁrm is in compliance
p(a) depends on the level of compliance eﬀort it undertakes a ∈ [0,a],w i t hp(a)∈ [0,1), p0 > 0
and p00 < 0. Thus, compliance is determined not only by the ﬁrm’s eﬀort level, but also by other
random factors. Higher eﬀort levels increase the probability of compliance, but never ensure it.
The ﬁrm’s eﬀort costs are given by a smooth, strictly increasing and strictly convex function C(a).
The ﬁrm is monitored by the regulator with some probability m. Monitoring of the ﬁrm is a
prerequisite to assessing its compliance status and acquiring any other signals of its compliance
eﬀort. The cost of a monitoring visit is given by cm. Assessing the ﬁrm’s compliance status during
a monitoring visit entails an additional cost cA.W ec a nt h i n ko fcm as capturing the cost of simply
visiting the ﬁrm, whereas cA captures, for example, the cost of measuring the ﬁrm’s pollution
emissions. These two types of costs are typically lumped together in models of enforcement. The
reason they are separated here will become evident further below. To simplify exposition, I will
use the term inspection cost to refer to the sum (cm + cA).
5Assessments of the ﬁrm’s compliance status may be subject to error. The ﬁrm may be perceived
to be in noncompliance even though it was actually compliant, and vice versa. Let θN|N denote
the probability that the regulator correctly concludes that the ﬁrm is noncompliant, and let θN|C
denote the probability that it does so incorrectly. The probabilities θC|C and θC|N are deﬁned
analogously. The accuracy of the regulator’s assessment technology is higher the larger is θN|N
and the smaller is θN|C. If assessments are perfectly accurate, θN|N =1and θN|C =0 .T h e
diﬀerence θN|N − θN|C (which equals θC|C − θC|N), is a measure of the accuracy of the assessment
technology. As is plausible, I assume the assessment technology has some discriminating power, so
the probability of correctly observing the ﬁrm’s compliance status is larger than the probability of
incorrectly observing it. Thus,
α ≡ θN|N − θN|C ∈ (0,1] (1)
The compliance status perceived by the regulator represents the ﬁr s ts i g n a lo ft h eﬁrm’s eﬀort
level acquired by the regulator. If the ﬁrm is perceived to be in compliance, no ﬁne is imposed and
no additional signals are acquired the regulator. If the ﬁrm is perceived to be in noncompliance,
the regulator conducts an “investigation” and acquires another (veriﬁable) signal of the ﬁrm’s eﬀort
level at a cost cs. This signal s is drawn from a ﬁnite set S.T h es e tS may be multidimensional,
and it may contain both quantitative and qualitative information, as is plausible for the outcome of
an investigation of ﬁrm behavior.5 Two diﬀerent types of variables may be contained in the signal
s: (1) variables that are a deterministic function of eﬀort level a but can only be observed by the
regulator with error, and (2) variables that are inherently randomly related to a.A ne x a m p l eo ft h e
ﬁrst type of variable would be the regulator’s observation of the degree to which the ﬁrm followed
procedures consistent with achieving compliance, based on inspections of the ﬁrm’s records and
interviews with its employees. An example of the second type of variable would be the state of
equipment needed to achieve compliance, speciﬁcally whether or not the equipment was in working
order. Equipment break downs are presumably random, with the probability of one occurring
depending on the ﬁrm’s compliance eﬀort.
5See Sinclair-Desgagne (1994) for the theory of multi-signal principal agent problems.
6The probability of observing a particular signal s ∈ S is given by q(s|a),w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt o
be a continuously diﬀerentiable function of a,w i t h 6
q(s|a) > 0 ∀{s,a}; for every a, q a(s|a) 6=0f o rs o m es. (2)
The ﬁrst assumption is a standard one and ensures that the moral hazard problem is not trivial.
The second assumption ensures that for every eﬀort level, at least some signals are informative.







The latter equality together with the second assumption in (2) implies that for every eﬀort level a,
qa(s|a) < 0 for some signals and qa(s|a) > 0 for others.
The ﬁn ei m p o s e do nt h eﬁrm for noncompliance can depend on the signal observed, and is
written f(s). Following Harrington, and Heyes and Rickman, among others, there is an exogenously
speciﬁed maximum ﬁne F. This is typically determined by legislation, the ﬁrm’s assets, or what
courts are likely to consider reasonable. I assume the magnitude of F is such that it does not induce
the ﬁrm to shut down, yet it is large enough to ensure the existence of a solution to the regulator’s
problem. Initially, ﬁnes are treated as costless transfers, I introduce ﬁne costs in Section 4.
As is common in principal-agent models, I assume the regulator is able to commit to its enforce-
ment policy at the start of the game. Furthermore, the ﬁrm’s cost function C(a), the probability
functions p(a) and q(s|a), and the characteristics of the assessment technology, θN|N and θN|C,a r e
assumed to be common knowledge. The model diﬀers from a typical principal-agent model by the
absence of a participation constraint. By assumption, the regulation is mandatory, and the ﬁrm
cannot exempt itself from being regulated. The participation constraint is replaced by a limited
6As implied by the above formulation, the ﬁrm’s (true) compliance status and the signal s are assumed to
be conditionally independent given the ﬁrm’s eﬀort level. This assumption, that the signals of the agent’s
eﬀort observed by the principal are conditionally independent, is common in the related literature on optimal
auditing, e.g., see Dye (1986). The assumption is relevant only when the regulator’s assessment technology
is imperfect. When the technology is perfect (α =1 ), s is acquired by the regulator only when the ﬁrm is
actually in noncompliance.
7liability constraint, which reﬂects the above-mentioned restrictions on the maximum ﬁne for non-
compliance.7 Inclusion of a participation constraint restricting the magnitude of the ﬁrm’s total
costs (which consist of eﬀort costs plus expected ﬁne costs) would not mitigate the desirability of
forgiveness. As shown below, forgiveness invariably lowers the ﬁrm’s expected ﬁne costs. There-
fore, for a given eﬀort level, a participation constraint that is binding when the regulator never
engages in forgiveness would not be binding when the regulator engages in forgiveness; similarly, a
constraint that is not binding in the ﬁrst scenario also would not be binding in the second one.
3. Costless Fines











The third term reﬂects the possibility of the ﬁrm being erroneously ﬁned for noncompliance. The
term drops out if compliance assessments are perfectly accurate. For a>0,t h eﬁrst-order condition












7The absence of a participation constraint and the inclusion of a limited liability constraint are quite
common in principal-agent models of regulation. See, for example, Innes (1999) and Malik (1993). This type
of model structure is plausible to the extent that regulation of the ﬁrm is socially desirable and F is not so
large as to induce the ﬁrm to shut down.
8This condition constitutes the incentive compatibility constraint faced by the regulator.8 Note that
the expression in braces must be negative for the condition to hold. The sign of the ﬁrst term in
braces is determined by the sign of the sum in this term, since θN|N − p(a)α ≡ θN|N[1 − p(a)]+
θN|Cp(a) > 0.
The regulator’s problem can be divided into two stages, as in Grossman and Hart (1983). In
the ﬁrst stage, the benevolent regulator minimizes the expected social costs of inducing the ﬁrm
to select some eﬀort level a>0. In the second stage, the regulator then chooses the eﬀort level
that minimizes total expected social costs, which consist of the social costs captured in the ﬁrst
stage objective function plus the social costs associated with noncompliance and the ﬁrm’s eﬀort
costs. Given the focus of this paper, I will restrict attention to the ﬁrst-stage problem. The second
stage simply calls for balancing the expected marginal social cost of inducing higher eﬀort and the
marginal beneﬁt of lower expected noncompliance.





θN|N[1 − p(a)] + θN|Cp(a)
ª
cs, (6)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (5), and a limited liability constraint,9
f(s) ≤ F ∀s. (7)
The two terms on the RHS of (6) capture expected inspection costs and expected investigation costs,
respectively. Note that the objective function and constraints are linear in the decision variables.
















The ﬁrst term on the LHS and the third term in braces clearly have the correct sign. This is also true of
the second term in braces given (3) and the result obtained below that f(s)=F unless qa(s|a)/q(s|a) is
positive and suﬃciently large, in which case f(s)=0 . The sign of the ﬁrst term in braces is ambiguous, but
the inequality will clearly hold even if the term is negative, provided it is not too large.
9In general, a constraint m ≤ 1 is also required. To avoid clutter, I have omitted this constraint, and
assume that the parameters of the problem ensure a solution with m ∈ (0,1].
9As a result, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem are both necessary and suﬃcient.
The structure of the objective function in (6) reﬂects the assumption that the regulator acquires
the signal s only if the ﬁrm is perceived to be in noncompliance. Thus, acquisition of s is contingent
on the ﬁrm’s perceived compliance status. One could instead assume that acquisition of s is not
made contingent on the ﬁrm’s perceived compliance status. It is easily veriﬁed that the regulator’s
costs would be higher in this case given the assumption that α>0, i.e., that the probability of
correctly detecting noncompliance is higher than the probability of incorrectly detecting it.10 Thus
the regulator is better oﬀ making investigations contingent on the ﬁrm’s perceived compliance
status, as one would expect.
3.1 Optimal Fines and Inspection Probability
To put the eﬀects of forgiveness in perspective, let us ﬁrst consider a setting in which the regulator
never conducts investigations and never forgives noncompliance. The regulator simply imposes a
ﬁne f whenever noncompliance is perceived. In this setting, the incentive compatibility constraint
reduces to
C0(a) − mp0(a)αf =0 , (8)
and the second term in the regulator’s objective function in (6) drops out. For this case, the optimal
enforcement policy is easily characterized:
Result 1 When the regulator never forgives noncompliance, the ﬁrm is monitored with probability




This policy reﬂects the conventional result in the literature on crime and punishment: to set ﬁnes
at their maximum level if they are costless transfers (Becker 1968). This allows the probability of
10For a given value of a, the optimal values of m and f(s) are no diﬀerent when acquisition of s is not
contingent on the ﬁrm’s perceived compliance status. This stems from the fact that: (i) the incentive
compatibility constraint remains the same, and (ii) the regulator’s objective function in (6) changes only to
the extent that the expression in braces is replaced by one. A comparison of the modiﬁed objective function
and the original one yields the conclusion that, given α>0, the regulator’s costs are lower when acquisition
of s is contingent on the ﬁrm’s compliance status.
10the ﬁne (m) to be reduced, lowering expenditures on inspections.
I now turn to the consequences of forgiveness. The primary objective is to demonstrate that for
some signals s, setting ﬁnes for noncompliance equal to zero, i.e., forgiving noncompliance, can be
optimal given that an investigation is conducted. Whether or not it is socially desirable to conduct
costly investigations is a question that is deferred to Section 3.3.
Given the linearity of the regulator’s problem in (5) — (7), its solution can be partly charac-
terized by examining the objective function and constraints. The optimal value of the monitoring









where f∗(s) denotes the optimal values of the ﬁnes. The optimal ﬁnes can be characterized using
the relevant Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
Φf ≡ µm
©
[θN|N − p(a)α]qa(s|a) − p0(a)αq(s|a)
ª
+ λ(s) ≥ 0, Φf · f(s)=0 ∀s, (10)
where µ and λ(s) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the the constraints in (5) and (7),
respectively. It is not diﬃcult to show that µ must be positive;11 λ(s) is by construction non-
negative.
Since f(s) does not appear in (10), the optimal ﬁnes will, in general, take on values of either
zero or F.12 If the expression in braces in (10) has a negative sign, the ﬁrst condition in (10) will
hold as an equality with λ(s) > 0,a n dt h eo p t i m a lﬁne will equal F. The expression in braces
obviously has a negative sign when qa < 0; it may also have a negative sign when qa > 0.H o w e v e r ,
11If µ were negative, (10) would imply that f(s)=F when the expression in braces is positive, but if this
were true then (5) could not hold because the expression in braces in (5) would be positive.
12Depending on the exogenously given values of θN|N, α, q(s|a), qa(s|a), p(a) and p0(a), the expression in
braces in (10) could take on a value of zero for some s. In such cases, the magnitude of the ﬁne is irrelevant,
for ease of exposition, I assume it is set equal to F.








If the above inequality holds for some signal s, (10) implies it is optimal to set f(s)=0and forgive
noncompliance. Let S0 ⊂ S denote the set of signals for which (11) holds.
The LHS of the inequality in (11) is simply the likelihood ratio associated with the signal s.T h e
RHS is the negative of the likelihood ratio associated with the signal “noncompliance perceived,”
which I denote by N: −LN(a,α) ≡−dln{[1 − p(a)]θN|N + p(a)θN|C}/da The magnitude of this
likelihood ratio is positively related to the accuracy of the regulator’s assessment technology, with
−LN(a,α) ⇒ 0a sα ⇒ 0, − LN(a,α) ⇒
p0(a)
1 − p(a)
as α ⇒ 1. (12)
−LN(a,α) is a measure of the evidence conveyed by perceived noncompliance of the ﬁrm having
chosen a low eﬀort level. Analogously, LS(s,a), the LHS of (11), is a measure of the strength of
evidence conveyed by the signal s that the ﬁrm had chosen a high eﬀort level. Thus, the inequality
in (11) indicates that the regulator will choose to forgive noncompliance if, and only if, the evidence
conveyed by the signal s of the ﬁrm having a chosen a high eﬀort level is stronger than the evidence
conveyed by perceived noncompliance of the ﬁrm having a chosen a low eﬀort level. This ﬁnding
is consistent with Holmstrom’s (1979) result that additional signals of an agent’s eﬀort choice are
valuable only if they alter the principal’s ex post assessment of the agent’s eﬀort choice.
Since −LN(a,α) approaches zero as the accuracy of the assessment technology decreases, the
inequality in (11) will invariably hold for some s if the accuracy of the assessment technology
is suﬃciently low. In the limiting case where α =0 , perceived noncompliance is ignored when
determining the magnitude of the ﬁne. The ﬁn ei sb a s e ds o l e l yo nt h es i g no fLS(s,a),w i t haﬁne
i m p o s e di f ,a n do n l yi f ,LS(s,a) < 0. These observations imply that the cardinality of S0, n(S0),
will be (weakly) larger the lower is the accuracy of the assessment technology.
It might seem implausible for α to take on values near zero, and for the regulator to virtually
ignore direct assessment of a ﬁrm’s compliance status when determining the magnitude of a ﬁne.
12However, this could well occur in some circumstances, especially when noncompliance is a fugitive
event.13
The set of signals for which (11) holds, and forgiveness is optimal, also depends on the desired
l e v e lo fe ﬀort a, though not in an easily predicted manner. It is readily veriﬁed that the LHS of
(11) is decreasing in a given the plausible assumption that qaa < 0 when qa > 0. However, the sign
of the derivative of the RHS with respect to a is ambiguous given the corresponding assumption
that p00 < 0.
It should be emphasized that inaccurate assessments are not necessary for forgiveness to be
optimal. The inequality in (11) can hold when assessments are perfectly accurate (α =1 ). Whether
or not it holds in this case depends on the relative magnitude of qa(s|a)/q(s|a) and p0(a)/[1−p(a)].
It is only if their relative magnitude is such that (11) does not hold for any signal s that f(s)=F
∀s, and the optimal enforcement policy is no diﬀerent than that described in Result 1.14
Therefore, we have:
Proposition 1 The regulator will choose to forgive noncompliance for some signals s if they con-
stitute suﬃciently strong evidence of the ﬁrm having chosen a high eﬀort level. The set of signals
for which noncompliance is forgiven, S0, is (weakly) larger, the lower is the accuracy of the regu-
lator’s assessment technology, α. For signals s/ ∈ S0, it is optimal to impose the maximum ﬁne F
for perceived noncompliance.
The set of signals for which noncompliance is forgiven can be characterized, at least partially, if
some structure is imposed on the set of possible signals S. Consider the simplest case where S is a
vector of values ordered from smallest to largest. If we make the common assumption that LS(s,a)
satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property, so LS(s,a) is increasing in s, noncompliance will
b ef o r g i v e n( i fi ti sa ta l l )f o rl a r g ev a l u e so fs, since they constitute stronger evidence of the ﬁrm
13Nyborg and Telle describe another possibility, drawn from Norwegian regulatory practice. Some reg-
ulations limit the amount of pollution a ﬁrm can emit over a period of a year. In such cases, the level of
pollution observed during a monitoring visit may tell the regulator little about the ﬁrm’s compliance with
the annual limit. As a result, the regulator is more inclined to make inferences about the ﬁrm’s compliance
eﬀort on the basis of other information collected during a monitoring visit.
14For this case, given (3), the denominator in (9) reduces to p0(a)αF.
13having chosen a high eﬀort level.15
The structure of the optimal enforcement policy in Proposition 1 implies that the signals in
S can be aggregated to yield a binary statistic that is mechanism suﬃcient (Demougin and Fluet
1998); that is, the binary statistic can be used to induce the ﬁrm to choose the desired eﬀort level





0 if s ∈ S0
1 if s ∈ S0
(13)
where S0 = S\S0 is the set of signals for which the maximum ﬁne is imposed. The probability that





By forgiving noncompliance when Y =0and imposing the maximum ﬁne when Y =1 ,t h er e g u l a t o r
can duplicate the outcome obtained when the signal s is observed. The usefulness of this binary
statistic will become evident shortly. Note that its likelihood ratio is given by σa(a)/σ(a).
3.2 The Beneﬁt of Forgiveness
Given the form of the regulator’s objective function in (6), the beneﬁt of forgiving noncompliance
must be a reduction in the monitoring probability needed to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint, reducing expected inspection costs, m[cm+cA]. This seems contrary to the conventional
wisdom that inspection costs are reduced by setting higher ﬁnes. The seeming contradiction stems
from the fact that, for a given monitoring probability, the additional information provided by the
signal s combined with selective forgiveness, enables the regulator to increase the marginal beneﬁt
to the ﬁrm of choosing a higher eﬀort level, as captured by the expression in braces in (5). In other
words, the regulator is able to increase the power of the penalty scheme, allowing the regulator to
15A similar result can be obtained if s is a multidimensional signal and S is a lattice that has a component-
wise partial ordering. If LS(s,a) satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property (see Sinclair-Desgagne 1994),
then forgiveness is associated with large values of the vector s.
14satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint with a lower monitoring probability.
The reduction in the monitoring probability is characterized in
Result 2 When forgiveness is optimal, it reduces the monitoring probability needed to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint. The magnitude of this reduction is: (i) negatively related
to the accuracy of the assessment technology, α; and (ii) positively related to the diﬀerence in
likelihood ratios ∆σ ≡ σa(a)/σ(a)−[−LN(a,α)],e x c e p tw h e na ni n c r e a s ei n∆σ is accompanied by
a proportionally larger decrease in the value of σ(a)[θN|N − p(a)α].
The proof is provided in the Appendix. Result 2 implies that, in general, the beneﬁt of forgiveness
is larger the less accurate is the regulator’s assessment technology, and the larger is the diﬀerence
in likelihood ratios ∆σ ≡ σa(a)/σ(a)−[−LN(a,α)].
The reduction in the monitoring probability, together with the fact that noncompliance is not
always punished, yields
Corollary 1 The ﬁrm’s expected costs are lower when the regulator engages in forgiveness.
Thus, as we would expect, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ when the regulator selectively forgives noncompli-
ance.
3.3 When are Investigations Desirable?
The above analysis demonstrates that investigations coupled with forgiveness can be socially desir-
able, because of their potential to reduce expected inspection costs. But investigations are costly
to conduct. They will reduce the social costs of achieving a desired eﬀort level only if the expected
costs of conducting investigations are oﬀset by the reduction in expected inspection costs. I now
derive a simple suﬃcient condition under which this oﬀset occurs.
Making use of (6) and Result 1, investigations coupled with forgiveness are desirable if, and
only if, R(a) < R(a),w h e r eR(a) ≡ cm∗ denotes the regulator’s indirect objective function when
investigations are never conducted. Now consider the regulator’s objective function when investi-
gations are conducted, but noncompliance is forgiven only for the realization of s that yields the
15largest value of the likelihood ratio LS(s,a) ≡ qa(s|a)/q(s|a); thus, for this realization, labeled
sM, (11) must hold. Let RM(a) denote the regulator’s objective function for this case. Clearly,
RM(a) ≥ R(a), since it may be optimal to forgive noncompliance for other realizations of s.T h e r e -
fore, RM(a) < R(a) is a suﬃcient condition for investigations to be desirable.










Let K denote the critical value of the cost ratio represented by the RHS of (15). Note that K
does not depend on C0(a) or F. Furthermore, from (11), K must be positive given the premise that
it is optimal to forgive noncompliance when sM is observed. The value of K will depend on the
values of θN|N and θN|C (recall α ≡ θN|N − θN|C). As shown in the Appendix, ∂K/∂θN|N < 0.
This implies, roughly speaking, that investigations are more likely to be desirable, the lower is
the regulator’s ability to correctly detect noncompliance. Correspondingly, ∂K/∂θN|C > 0,i . e . ,
investigations are more likely to be desirable the lower is the regulator’s ability to correctly detect
compliance. Comparing (11), with s = sM,t ot h eR H So f( 1 5 ) ,w ec a ns e et h a tt h ev a l u eo fK is
also related to the diﬀerence in likelihood ratios, ∆S ≡ LS(sM,a) − [−LN(a,α)]. In fact, we can
write K ≡ [q(sM|a)/p0(a)α]∆. This expression reveals that an increase in ∆S would result in a
larger value of K, except in the case where the increase in ∆S is accompanied by a proportionally
larger reduction in the value of q(sM|a)/p0(a)α, a possibility that cannot be ruled out.
These results are summarized more formally as follows:
Proposition 2 Investigations, together with forgiveness, reduce social costs if the ratio cS/(cm+cA)
falls below some critical value K. This critical value does not depend on the marginal cost of eﬀort
(C0(a))o rt h em a x i m u mﬁne (F). It is a decreasing function of the accuracy of the regulator’s
assessment technology, α; and it is an increasing function of the diﬀerence in likelihood ratios
∆S ≡ LS(sM,a) − [−LN(a,α)] except when the increase in ∆S is accompanied by a proportionally
larger decrease in q(sM|a)/p0(a)α.
We can get some sense of the magnitude of K by calculating its value for hypothetical values
16of the underlying probabilities. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 1. For the
initial, and baseline, calculation, I assume the regulator’s assessment technology is perfect, so
α = θN|N =1 . Let the probability of the ﬁrm being in compliance, p(a)=0 .8. Let the probability
of sM being observed, q(sM|a)=0 .2, as is not unreasonable if the set of possible signals S has
multiple elements, with sM being the signal that conveys the strongest evidence of the ﬁrm having
chosen a high eﬀort level. Note, from (15), that K depends on the ratio qa(sM|a)/p0(a)α .L e t
this ratio equal 4, which implies, given the other values assumed, that LS(sM,a)=4·[−LN(a,α)],
ensuring that forgiveness is optimal when sM is observed. For these values, K =3 ,a ss h o w ni nt h e
ﬁrst row of the table, i.e., investigations are desirable if the cost of conducting an investigation is no
more than three times as high as the cost of conducting an inspection. The next three rows show
the eﬀects of changes in the ratio qa(sM|a)/p0(a). When qa(sM|a)/p0(a)=1 , K =0 , which implies
that investigations are not desirable, since cS/(cm + cA) cannot be negative. In fact, forgiveness is
not optimal for this case (and this case alone) since LS(sM,a)=−LN(a,α).
The second set of results show the eﬀect of varying the probability of compliance, while holding
other probabilities at their baseline values, and the third set shows the eﬀect of varying the proba-
bility of observing sM (which is also the probability of forgiveness). These variations result in values
of K that range between 2 and 3.5. The last two sets of results show the eﬀects of introducing
modest errors in the assessment technology. K then takes on values between 3.3 and 6.0.
In practice, the relative magnitude of investigation costs and inspection costs (cS/(cm +cA))i s
likely to vary widely across regulatory settings. In some cases, investigation costs may well be lower
than inspection costs, whereas in others they may be much higher. The results in Table 1 suggest
that investigations can be socially desirable even when the cost of conducting an investigation is
several times higher than the cost of conducting an inspection. This is particularly true when the
regulator’s assessment technology is imperfect.
4. Costly Fines
The model presented in the previous section embodies the common assumption that ﬁnes are
costless transfers. But there are invariably administrative costs associated with collecting ﬁnes.
17In addition, ﬁnes may be subject to costly administrative or judicial reviews. Accordingly, in this
section I incorporate ﬁne costs in the model. Speciﬁcally, I allow for a constant unit (or marginal)
ﬁne cost, cf. It may be more plausible to assume that ﬁne costs are ﬁxed, and invariant with the
magnitude of the ﬁne. However, ﬁxed ﬁne costs make the analysis much more tedious, and yield
results that are qualitatively identical to those with a constant unit ﬁne cost.
I begin, once again, by considering the benchmark case in which investigations are never con-
ducted and noncompliance is never forgiven. The regulator’s (ﬁrst-stage) objective function now has
an additional term, capturing expected ﬁne costs: m[cm+cA]+m
©
[1 − p(a)]θN|N + p(a)θN|C
ª
cff.
The constraints of the regulator’s problem are unchanged. In particular, the incentive compatibility
constraint is still given by (8). Intuition suggests that the presence of ﬁne costs should alter the
optimal enforcement policy and lower the optimal ﬁne. This is not true, however. Fine costs have
no eﬀect on the optimal enforcement policy, regardless of their magnitude:
Result 3 When the regulator never forgives noncompliance, the presence of ﬁn ec o s t sd o e sn o t
alter the optimal enforcement policy: it is still optimal to impose the maximum ﬁne F whenever
noncompliance is perceived, and to monitor the ﬁrm with probability m∗ = C0(a)/p0(a)αF.
This result can be explained as follows. Suppose the ﬁne is not set equal to its maximum value
F. The regulator could then raise the ﬁne to F and lower the monitoring probability so that the
expected ﬁne for noncompliance, mf, is unchanged. These changes would not aﬀect the incentive
compatibility constraint nor would they alter the magnitude of the second term in the regulator’s
objective function, since both are functions of mf. However, they would lower expected inspection
costs (the ﬁrst term in the regulator’s objective function), lowering the total costs faced by the
regulator. This result holds af o r t i o r iif ﬁne costs are ﬁxed and do not vary with the magnitude of
the ﬁne.
I now turn to the model with forgiveness. Once again, ﬁne costs result in an additional term in



















but leave the constraints of the problem, (5) and (7), unchanged. Accordingly, the optimal in-
spection probability is still given by the expression in (9), however, its magnitude will diﬀer to the
extent that the optimal ﬁne scheme is altered. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the optimal ﬁnes
can be written:











≥ 0, Φf · f(s)=0 ∀s, (17)
where, as before, µ is the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint and λ(s) ≥ 0
is the multiplier for the limited liability constraint. It can be veriﬁed quite easily that µ must still
be strictly positive.










T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h eﬁne cost term implies that this condition is less stringent than the earlier
condition in (11). Therefore, (18) invariably holds for all signals that satisfy (11), s ∈ S0,a n di t
m a yh o l df o rs o m es/ ∈ S0. Thus, the set of signals for which noncompliance is forgiven is weakly
larger when ﬁnes are costly: n(S
f
0) ≥ n(S0) with S
f
0 ⊃ S0,w h e r eS
f
0 denotes the set of signals that
satisfy (18).
This result is consistent with common intuition. We would expect the regulator to be more
inclined to forgive noncompliance when ﬁnes are costly. Because forgiveness may now be motivated
b yt h ed e s i r et or e d u c eﬁne costs, the optimal monitoring probability may now be larger than when
ﬁnes are costless, m∗
f ≥ m∗, to compensate for the reduced frequency with which ﬁnes are imposed.
19This can be established by inspecting the denominator of the expression in (9) for the optimal
monitoring probability. Suppose there is some signal s0 for which it is optimal to impose a ﬁne
f(s0) > 0 when ﬁnes are costless but not when they are costly. Then the expression for m∗
f diﬀers





in the denominator of m∗
f. From (11), we can determine that this expression must have a positive
sign given the premise that f(s0) > 0 when ﬁnes are costless. Thus, we can conclude that if
n(S
f
0) >n (S0), m∗
f must be larger than m∗; however, if S
f
0 = S0, m∗
f = m∗.16
These results are summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 When ﬁnes are costly to impose the set of signals for which the regulator forgives
noncompliance, S
f
0, is (weakly) larger than when ﬁnes are costless, S
f
0 ⊃ S0. In addition, the
optimal monitoring probability may be larger, m∗
f ≥ m∗. For signals s/ ∈ S
f
0, it is optimal to impose
the maximum ﬁne F for perceived noncompliance.
Because forgiveness may now be motivated by the desire to reduce ﬁne costs rather than inspection
costs, it is no longer possible to state unequivocally that forgiveness lowers the optimal monitoring
probability (m∗
f < m∗). As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility that the regulator’s expected
inspection costs are now higher when it engages in forgiveness. The regulator’s expected ﬁne costs
must be lower, however, as can be veriﬁed by examining the regulator’s objective function in (16).17
A comparison of (16) and (4) shows that the regulator’s expected ﬁne costs are linearly related
to the expected ﬁne faced by the ﬁrm. The above observation therefore implies that the ﬁrm’s
16Qualitatively identical conclusions hold if ﬁne costs are ﬁxed. For each value of s for which f(s) > 0
when ﬁnes are costless, the regulator would now have to compare the beneﬁto fap o s i t i v eﬁne, as captured
by the reduction in expected inspection costs due to a lower monitoring probability, to the ﬁxed ﬁne cost.
Positive ﬁnes would be retained only for those values of s for which this beneﬁt exceeds the ﬁxed ﬁne cost.
17If the optimal monitoring probability is higher when the regulator engages in forgiveness, then forgiveness
must reduce the expected ﬁne costs incurred by the regulator (captured by the third term in (16)). There
would, otherwise, be no reason to engage in forgiveness. If the optimal monitoring probability is lower,
then expected ﬁne costs must be lower, since forgiveness implies that perceived noncompliance is not always
punished.
20expected costs continue to be lower when the regulator engages in forgiveness. Thus, we have:
Corollary 2 When ﬁnes are costly, forgiveness may not result in a lower monitoring probability.
However, it invariably lowers the regulator’s expected ﬁne costs, and the expected costs faced by the
ﬁrm.
5. Self-Reporting
A common feature of regulations is the requirement that ﬁrms self-report their compliance status
(Malik 1993, Kaplow and Shavell 1994, Innes 1999). In this section, I incorporate self-reporting
in the model and show that forgiveness can be optimal in this setting as well. Forgiveness can
now occur in two scenarios: when the ﬁrm reports noncompliance and when it is perceived to have
dishonestly reported compliance. For the sake of brevity, I only allow for forgiveness in the ﬁrst
scenario. Although forgiveness may be desirable in the second scenario, it hinges on θN|C,t h e
probability of the regulator incorrectly concluding that the ﬁrm is noncompliant, being suﬃciently
large. To identify the eﬀects of self-reporting more easily, I ignore ﬁne costs.
The ﬁrm’s compliance status is now assessed only if it reports itself in compliance. Let mC
denote the probability that it is monitored following such a report and an assessment of its com-
pliance status conducted. If the assessment indicates the ﬁrm is in noncompliance, it is ﬁned an
amount fNC,w h e r eNC denotes the event “noncompliance perceived when compliance reported.”
If the ﬁrm reports noncompliance, there is presumably no need for an assessment of the ﬁrm’s
compliance status. However, the regulator does conduct an investigation and acquires the signal
s, so as to be able to selectively forgive noncompliance. In order to conduct an investigation, the
regulator must visit the ﬁrm, incurring the monitoring cost cm, in addition to the investigation cost
cS.
For the ﬁrm to report its compliance status truthfully, the expected ﬁne it faces when honest
must be lower than the expected ﬁne it faces when dishonest.18 When the ﬁrm is in noncompliance,
18The revelation principle allows us to restrict attention to incentive compatible policies that induce
truthful reporting. I assume, as usual, that if the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between being honest and dishonest, it




q(s|a)fN(s) − mCθN|N fNC ≤ 0, (20)
where fN(s) denotes the ﬁne imposed when the ﬁrm self-reports noncompliance. When the ﬁrm is




q(s|a)fN(s) ≤ 0. (21)
The ﬁrst term in (21) reﬂects the possibility of the ﬁrm being erroneously ﬁned for noncompliance
when it reports compliance. Intuition suggests that (21) should not be binding at an optimum.
This is, in fact, correct. Comparing (21) and (20), we can see that if (20) is binding, then (21) will
invariably hold as a strict inequality, since θN|C <θ N|N (see (1)). To simplify the exposition, I will
proceed by solving a relaxed problem in which (21) is ignored and show that (20) is binding at the
solution to this relaxed problem.
Assuming the truth-telling constraint in (20) holds, the ﬁrm always reports noncompliance







Given a>0,t h eﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁrm’s problem, and the incentive compatibility
19The ﬁrm’s objective function reﬂects a typical paradox of principal-agent models: the regulator can
mistakenly punish the ﬁrm for dishonestly reporting compliance even though it “knows,” given the structure
of the game, that the ﬁrm must have submitted an honest report. Ignoring perceived dishonest reporting
would, of course, eliminate the ﬁrm’s incentive to report truthfully.







q(s|a)fN(s)+p0(a)mCθN|CfNC =0 . (23)
Absent ﬁne costs, the regulator’s problem is
min
mC≥0,f N(s)≥0,f NC≥0
p(a)mC[cm + cA]+[ 1− p(a)][cm + cS], (24)
subject to (23), the truth-telling constraint (20), and two limited liability constraints,21
fN(s) ≤ F ∀s; (25)
fNC ≤ F. (26)
The ﬁrst term in the objective function captures expected inspection costs, and the second, expected
investigation costs. The former are incurred only when the ﬁrm reports compliance and the latter
only when it reports noncompliance. Note that this problem is also linear in the decision variables.
As before, I ﬁrst characterize the optimal enforcement policy when the regulator does not
conduct investigations and never forgives noncompliance. The truth-telling constraint (20) then
simpliﬁes to fN − mCθN|NfNC ≤ 0, and the incentive compatibility constraint (23) reduces to
C0(a) − p0(a)fN + p0(a)mCθN|CfNC =0 ,w h e r efN is a constant ﬁne. Since the regulator does
not conduct investigations, the second term in the regulator’s objective function (24) drops out.
20The condition is both necessary and suﬃcient for a unique optimum if the ﬁrm’s objective function is
strictly convex,
C00 +[ 1− p]
X
s∈S










The ﬁrst term clearly has the correct sign, as does the third term using an argument similar to that in
footnote 8. The last term also has the correct sign, because, as argued above, (21) invariably holds as a
strict inequality at the solution to the regulator’s problem. The sign of the second term is ambiguous. The
inequality will hold even if this term is negative, provided it is not too large.
21Once again, to reduce clutter, I omit the constraint for the monitoring probability and assume that the
parameters of the problem ensure mC ∈ (0,1].
23Following Malik (1993), it can be determined quite easily that the optimal enforcement policy takes
the following form:
Result 4 (Malik 1993) When the ﬁrm is required to self-report its compliance status and the
regulator never forgives noncompliance, the ﬁrm is ﬁned an amount f
∗
N <Fwhen it reports




The ﬁne for reported noncompliance, f
∗
N must be set below F, because the truth telling constraint
would not hold otherwise. The precise value of f
∗
N is determined by the incentive compatibility
constraint. Setting f
∗
NC = F is optimal since it lowers the monitoring probability needed to satisfy
the truth-telling constraint.
Let us now characterize the optimal enforcement policy with forgiveness. It is easily veriﬁed
that setting fNC = F is still optimal. The optimal values of the ﬁnes for reported noncompliance,

















fN · fN(s)=0 ∀s, (27)
where τ ≥ 0 is the multiplier associated with the truth-telling constraint in (20), λN(s) ≥ 0 is the
multiplier associated with the limited liability constraint in (25), and µ is the multiplier associated
with the incentive compatibility constraint, (23). I show in the Appendix that µ>0, as before,
and that τ>0, so the truth-telling constraint is binding (as claimed earlier).
From (27), we can see that reported noncompliance is forgiven when the signal s is observed if,










Comparing this condition to (11), the condition for forgiveness to be optimal in the absence of self-
reporting, we see that the LHS of (28) is larger given the presence of the additional term associated
with the truth-telling constraint. The RHS of (28) is also larger than the RHS of (11) if θN|C > 0;
but if θN|C =0 , it is of the same magnitude. Therefore, in general, we cannot specify whether
24reported noncompliance is more, or less, likely to be forgiven than perceived noncompliance absent
self-reporting. But if the assessment technology is such that the ﬁrm is never mistakenly found
to be in noncompliance (θN|C =0 ), then reported noncompliance is more likely to be forgiven,
since (28) is then less stringent than (11). By continuity, this conclusion must also hold for values
of θN|C suﬃciently close to zero. Note that this requirement on the value of θN|C is weaker than
the requirement that the assessment technology be perfect (α =1 ), or nearly so. This would
additionally require that θN|N equal one or be suﬃciently close to one.
Letting SSR
0 denote the set of signals for which reported noncompliance is forgiven, we can
therefore write:
Proposition 4 Forgiveness may be optimal when the ﬁrm self-reports noncompliance. When
θN|C =0or is suﬃciently close to zero, the set of signals for which self-reported noncompliance is
forgiven, SSR
0 , is (weakly) larger than the set of signals for which noncompliance is forgiven in the
absence of self-reporting, SSR
0 ⊃ S0.
An examination of the regulator’s objective function in (24) indicates that the beneﬁt of forgiveness
must be a reduction in the monitoring probability mC. There is no other avenue by which forgive-
ness can be beneﬁcial to the regulator. This implies that the expected ﬁne for falsely reporting
compliance, mCθN|NfNC, which is the second term in the truth-telling constraint (20), must be
smaller when the regulator engages in forgiveness (recall that setting fNC = F is optimal whether
or not the regulator engages in forgiveness). Since (20) is always binding, this, in turn, implies that
the ﬁrst term in (20),
P
q(s|a)fN(s), the expected ﬁne for reported noncompliance, must also be
lower when the regulator engages in forgiveness. These observations, together with the form of the
ﬁrm’s objective function in (22), yield
Corollary 3 When the ﬁrm is required to self-report its compliance status, forgiveness lowers the
optimal monitoring probability and the ﬁrm’s expected costs.
Thus, as before, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ when the regulator conducts investigations and selectively
forgives noncompliance.
256. Concluding Remarks
By extending a simple deterrence-based model of regulation to incorporate an additional, possibly
multi-dimensional, signal of the regulated ﬁrm’s compliance eﬀort, I have shown that selectively
forgiving noncompliance can be socially desirable. The additional signal of eﬀort corresponds to
information commonly collected by regulatory authorities on ﬁrms’ compliance activities. The
model thus explains selective forgiveness of noncompliance and the collection of information on a
ﬁrm’s compliance activities and not just its compliance status.
If ﬁnes are costless transfers, selective forgiveness allows the regulator to reduce the probability
with which it needs to conduct costly inspections of the ﬁrm. If ﬁnes are costly, another beneﬁt
of selective forgiveness is a reduction in the ﬁne costs incurred by the regulator. The beneﬁts
of selective forgiveness must be weighed against the costs of conducting the investigations that
yield the additional signal of the ﬁrm’s eﬀort. In the basic model examined, with costless ﬁnes
and no self-reporting of compliance status, I identify a simple suﬃcient condition under which
investigations are socially desirable. The condition indicates that investigations are desirable under
a range of circumstances, especially if the regulator is only able to assess the ﬁrm’s compliance
status imperfectly. From the ﬁrm’s perspective, forgiveness is always desirable, since it reduces the
ﬁrm’s expected costs.
One of the assumptions underlying the analysis is that the regulator is benevolent and minimizes
social costs. The results obtained would be much the same for a budget-constrained regulator that
maximizes the probability of compliance or minimizes the expected social losses from noncompliance
(as in Nyborg and Telle, and Heyes and Rickman). Regulators with either of these objectives would
want the ﬁrm to choose the highest eﬀort level possible, given the regulatory budget constraint.
Hence, the regulator would still want to minimize the regulatory costs of achieving a given eﬀort
level, as is true of the benevolent regulator. Thus, regulators with these objectives would view
forgiveness no less favorably than a benevolent regulator. The same would not be true, however,
of a regulator that valued expected ﬁne revenues, so that some weighted value of these revenues
were subtracted from its objective function (as in Grieson and Singh 1990, for example). Such a
26regulator would view forgiveness less favorably, because, as we have seen, forgiveness reduces the
expected ﬁn e sp a i db yt h eﬁrm. The degree to which such a regulator would engage in forgiveness
would depend on the precise form of its objective function and the weight attached to ﬁne revenues.
Another assumption underlying the analysis is that acquisition of the signal s is contingent on
the ﬁrm’s perceived compliance status. But s, or some component of it, could be acquired ﬁrst,
and assessment of the ﬁrm’s compliance status could be conditioned on its realization. This would
be desirable when assessing the ﬁrm’s compliance status is relatively costly, as is true for some
environmental regulations (e.g., see Russell et al. 1986, Chapter 2; Hunter and Waterman 1996,
39-46). In such cases, the regulator could ﬁrst acquire a less costly signal of the ﬁrm’s compliance
eﬀort (e.g., by inspecting the condition of the ﬁrm’s physical plant), and then assess the ﬁrm’s
compliance status only if this signal suggested that the ﬁrm had chosen a lower-than-desired eﬀort
level. Russell et al. (Chapter 2) and Nyborg and Telle report that this is not uncommon in
practice. This sequence of events could be accommodated by modifying the model so that the
signal s is acquired in the ﬁrst stage and the ﬁrm’s compliance status is assessed in the second
one. In such a model, scope for forgiveness would be eliminated: if the realization of s induced
the regulator to assess the ﬁrm’s compliance status, the regulator would invariably punish the
ﬁrm if noncompliance were perceived–there would otherwise be no reason to incur the assessment
cost cA. Scope for forgiveness could be restored by adding a third stage and separating out the
components of s into those that can be acquired at low cost (relative to cA) and those that can
only be acquired at high cost. Let sL and sH denote these two types of signals. The regulator
would begin by acquiring sL and conditioning the decision to assess the ﬁrm’s compliance status
on its realization. If an assessment is conducted and indicated noncompliance, the regulator would
then acquire the signal sH. Fines would be contingent on the realization of sH in the same way
that ﬁnes are contingent on the realization of s in the model presented here.
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29Appendix
A.1 Proof of Result 2
This result is most easily established by working with the reciprocals of the optimal monitoring
probabilities with and without forgiveness, and examining the diﬀerence (1/m∗−1/m∗). The larger
is this diﬀerence, the larger is the reduction in the monitoring probability achieved by forgiveness.





















We can establish that the expression in braces is positive as follows. By deﬁnition, for s ∈ S0,
noncompliance is forgiven and the expression in braces in the ﬁrst condition in (10) is positive.
Summing the expression in braces in (10) for all s ∈ S0 yields the expression in braces in (A-1),
which, in turn, must be positive.
Now consider the eﬀect on (A-1) of a reduction in α from α0 to α00, due either to a reduction
in θN|N or an increase in θN|C. We know from Proposition 1 that S0 is weakly larger the smaller




0. First consider the case where S0 is
unchanged: S0
0 = S00
0. A reduction in α due to an increase in θN|C unambiguously increases the
diﬀerence (1/m∗−1/m∗), since it increases the magnitude of the ﬁrst term in braces in (A-1) while
reducing the magnitude of the second one. The eﬀect of a reduction in θN|N is less transparent,
since it reduces the magnitude of both terms. However, we know that the ﬁrst sum in braces is
positive, as is the second sum. As is easily veriﬁed, the relative weight attached to the ﬁrst sum,
[θN|N −p(a)α]/p0(a)α,i sd e c r e a s i n gi nθN|N. Therefore, a reduction in θN|N increases the diﬀerence
(1/m∗ − 1/m∗).
Now consider the case where n(S00
0) >n (S0
0).L e tD ≡ S00
0\S0
0 denote the set of additional signals
for which noncompliance is forgiven as a result of the reduction in α. The expression in braces in








This term must also have a positive sign given (10). Thus, the magnitude of the diﬀerence (1/m∗−
1/m∗) is further increased.















The expression in braces is the diﬀerence in likelihood ratios, ∆σ,s p e c i ﬁed in Result 2. As can be
seen from (A-3), an increase in ∆σ will imply a larger value for (1/m∗ −1/m∗), unless the increase
in ∆σ is accompanied by a proportionally larger reduction in the value of σ(a)[θN|N −p(a)α]. The
possibility of such a reduction cannot be ruled out.
A.2. Signs of ∂K/∂θN|N and ∂K/∂θN|C








[θN|N − p(a)α]2 . (A-4)
It can be veriﬁed that this expression is negative given the fact that α[1 − p(a)] < [θN|N − p(a)α]
and the premise that forgiveness is optimal when sM is observed (so (11) holds).







[θN|N − p(a)α]2, (A-5)
which is positive since qa(sM|a) > 0 w h e nf o r g i v e n e s si so p t i m a l ,a si st r u eb ya s s u m p t i o nw h e n
s = sM.
31A.3. Establishing µ>0 and τ>0 given Self-Reporting
I ﬁrst rule out µ =0and then rule out µ<0.I fτ>0,t h e nµ =0implies that the ﬁrst condition
in (27) always holds as an inequality, which in turn implies fN(s)=0∀s. But then (20) cannot be
binding, contradicting the premise that τ>0.I fτ =0 , then the following ﬁrst-order condition for
the monitoring probability, mC, cannot hold when µ =0 :
p(a)[cm + θN|CcS]=τθN|NfNC − µθN|Cp0(a)fNC. (A-6)
Now suppose µ<0. Then (27) implies fN(s) > 0 only if [1 − p(a)]qa(s|a) − p0(a)q(s|a) > 0,
which in turn implies that the sum of the second and third terms in (23) must have a positive sign.
But then (23) cannot hold, because the fourth term is non-negative.
We can now rule out τ =0 .G i v e nµ>0, (A-6) does not hold if τ =0 .
32Table 1: Hypothetical Values of K
qa(sM|a)/
p0(a)
p(a) q(sM|a) θN|N θN|C K
4 0 . 8 0 . 2 103
2 0 . 8 0 . 2 101
1 0 . 8 0 . 2 100
6 0 . 8 0 . 2 105
4 0.7 0 . 2 103 . 3
4 0.9 0 . 2 102
40 . 8 0.1 103 . 5
40 . 8 0.3 102 . 5
40 . 8 0 . 2 0.9 03 . 3
40 . 8 0 . 2 0.9 0.1 4.2
40 . 8 0 . 2 0.9 0.2 5.1
40 . 8 0 . 2 0.8 03 . 7
40 . 8 0 . 2 0.8 0.1 4.9
40 . 8 0 . 2 0.8 0.2 6.0
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